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Professor Coates Is Right. Now Please Study
Stockholder Voting.
R. FRANKLIN BALOTrI
J. TRAvis LASTER1
We live today in the Poison Pill Era. The stockholder rights plan,
commonly known as the "poison pill," has profoundly affected every
aspect of mergers and acquisitions practice. In the days before poison
pills, boards of directors faced with tender offers could do little more
than exhort their stockholders not to tender or cobble together a transactional alternative. The board had no direct role in the process. Now,
armed with a pill, a board of directors can interpose itself between the
target corporation's stockholders and the offeror and prevent the
acquirer from buying shares. Put simply, a board with a pill has the
power to block a tender offer.
This revolutionary development prompted the inevitable question:
Are pills a good thing? An army of. scholars attempted to answer this
question, and the primary evidence on which they relied were "event
studies," statistical analyses that sought to determine whether pills
increased or decreased stockholder wealth. To assess pill impact, the
studies asked whether the adoption of a pill, all other things being equal,
affected a firm's stock price. The conflicting and ambiguous results of
these studies have fueled nearly two decades of debate.
Enter Professor John C. Coates IV and his excellent article, Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand?2
Professor Coates believes that the predominant conclusion drawn by
practitioners, scholars and other commentators from event studies has
been that poison pills and other antitakeover amendments ("ATAs")
decrease firm value. He responds with a simple thesis: their conclusion
is wrong. In his words, "prior empirical studies of takeover defenses do
not support the belief that defenses either increase or decrease firm value
on average." 3 Professor Coates's article defends this thesis.
We agree with Professor Coates's rejection of event studies,
1. The authors are members of the Delaware bar and practice with the firm of Richards,
Layton & Finger. The views expressed in the article are solely those of the authors and do not

necessarily represent the views of Richards, Layton & Finger or its clients. The authors wish to
thank the Honorable Jack B. Jacobs and Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article.
2. 54 U. MiAMi L. REv. 783 (2000).
3. Id. at 786.
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although primarily for reasons that he does not mention. First, we follow the repeated instruction of the Delaware courts that market value
does not determine firm value, which means that market evidence from
event studies cannot provide a normative justification for pills. Second,
we question the impact that pills can have on firm value, except to the
extent that some portion of a stock's market value is attributable to takeover speculation; we, therefore, doubt the validity of studies that fail to
quantify this portion of a stock's value and incorporate it in their analysis of the effects (or non-effects) of pill adoption. Third, we submit that
the market may not understand fully or internalize evolving Delaware
jurisprudence regarding pills and that market participants may instead
rely on a potentially misleading montage of anecdotal accounts in which
victories for potential acquirers have figured more prominently than they
should. Finally, we agree with Professor Coates that as a practical matter, all Delaware corporations effectively have poison pills in place. We
suggest, in light of the effectiveness and practical omnipresence of
poison pills, that scholars shift their attention away from studying what
is now a fundamental feature of the corporate law landscape and focus
instead on stockholder voting, which has become the pivotal issue in
takeover disputes. Professor Coates's fine article provides strong support for such a result.
I.

THE TREATMENT OF MARKET EVIDENCE UNDER DELAWARE LAW.

Professor Coates begins his article with a comprehensive overview
of the many statistical flaws in event studies, and he concludes from this
that event studies should not be used to justify pills.4 His statistical critique appears careful and well-crafted. It certainly is convincing. From
a Delaware law perspective, however, discounting event studies is nothing new. Event studies focus solely on market value, yet the Delaware
courts consistently have held that market value does not determine firm
value.5 The Delaware cases also make clear that market value does not
4. See id. at 788.
5. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875-76 (Del. 1985); see also Cede & Co. v.

Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996) (explaining that "the market price of shares may
not be representative of true value") (citation and quotation omitted); Rapid-American Corp. v.

Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992) (stating that "the Court of Chancery long ago rejected
exclusive reliance upon market value in an appraisal action"); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413

A.2d 137, 141 (Del. 1980) (explaining that "market value may not be taken as the sole measure of
the value of the stock"); Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A.2d 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934) (finding that
"[tihere are too many accidental circumstances entering into the making of market prices to admit
them as sure and exclusive reflectors of fair value"). The Delaware courts are even more skeptical
of market value when a corporation's stock price is inflated by a tender offer, proposed transaction
or auction. See Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., C.A. No. 244, slip op. at 21 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993)
(explaining that following an announcement of a tender offer or during an auction the market price
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establish an unvarying standard for director behavior. As former Chancellor William T. Allen explained, "[d]irectors may operate on the theory that the stock market valuation is 'wrong' in some sense, without
breaching faith with shareholders. No one, after all, has access to more
information concerning the corporation's present and future condition."6
For purposes of Delaware law, therefore, evidence of market value from
event studies cannot provide a normative justification for poison pills.
II.

TiHE UNCERTAIN LINK BETWEEN MARKET EVIDENCE AND
FIRM VALUE.

We also question the value of market evidence from event studies
in assessing the benefits of pills because it is far from clear in what sense
a poison pill could affect the value of a firm, other than by nudging the
price paid for its stock in the market. The adoption of a pill, after all,
does not change the intrinsic nature of the firm's business. It does not
add any assets or liabilities to the company's balance sheet. It does not
increase or decrease cash flow. It also does not alter any variable typically used in valuation metrics. A comparable company analysis will
not be affected. The value derived from a comparable transaction analysis will not change. From the perspective of the ongoing business, therefore, the adoption of a pill is meaningless. Event studies, thus naturally,
would not show any effect.
Event studies theoretically can, however, reveal an impact on a
firm's market value. The validity of event studies then will turn on what
exactly the market is valuing. Because pill adoption does not affect the
business itself, for market value to change, the market must be according
value to something other than the firm's underlying business. The
answer that some economists would give to the question of what the
market purportedly is valuing is that stockholders accord value to their
ability to receive a control premium. In other words, there is an element
of value that exists in a widely-traded public corporation (but not in a
"may reflect a control premium and other factors connected with the acquirer's intentions but
unrelated to the value of the firm"); Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 466 (Del. Ch.

1975) (explaining that "exceptants may not, in my opinion, be allowed to minimize the fact that
Lorillard and Glen Alden, by engaging in a battle to acquire control of Schenley in the mid1960's, drove up the market price of the common stock of such corporation beyond its true market
value").
6. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., C.A. No. 10670, slip op. at 49 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989), affid, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). More recently, the Court of Chancery expressed

a hope that "directors and officers can always say that they know more about the company than
the company's stockholders - after all, they are paid to know more." Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,
C.A. No. 17626, slip op. at 74 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2000, revised Feb. 11, 2000). The reference to
"the company's stockholders" applies with equal force to the market, which is simply a means by
which the composition of the company's stockholder base changes over time.
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privately-held or majority-controlled public corporation) that derives
merely from the speculative possibility someday that a takeover bid may
emerge. It is this "takeover fluff' that loses some of its loft when a pill
is adopted.
Assuming that takeover fluff exists, it still comes as little surprise
that event studies would not reveal any discernable effect on market
value from the adoption of a poison pill. After all, takeover fluff must
be a fragile and highly subjective thing. How much takeover fluff can
there be for a company like General Motors or DuPont? How much
takeover fluff can there be for a company on a clear day without any
takeover threat in the air? How much takeover fluff can there be for
shares representing minority positions in a corporation where, unless the
board adopts a poison pill, its stockholders are vulnerable to creeping
acquisitions, two-tiered coercive tender offers, and other valuing-reducing threats that result from the well-recognized collective action
problems faced by holders of diffuse stockholder interests? How reliable can takeover fluff be when it vacillates wildly in a takeover contest
based not on some measure of intrinsic change-in-control value but
rather based on whatever the highest bid might be on a particular day?
Measured across a sample of heterogeneous stocks in an event study, it
hardly seems surprising that takeover fluff may aggregate to nothing (or
nearly nothing) at all. An event study would thus reveal no overall
effect.
Event studies should not fare any better if takeover fluff is assumed
both to exist and be significant. In that case, event studies, as historically conducted, still would not reveal any lessons about pill adoption
because a study would need to determine the percentage of takeover
fluff in the market price of every stock if evaluated before any possible
conclusions could be drawn. This would require offering a means for
measuring takeover fluff, quantifying the portion of value attributable to
takeover fluff, determining the effect that pill adoption has on that element of value, and then considering and interpreting the resulting market
impact, if any, in light of those effects. Without this data, conclusions
from event studies will be meaningless. If two companies are identical
in all respects, except that the market price of Company A consists of
50% takeover fluff while the market price of Company B consists of 0%
takeover fluff, then arguably the adoption of a pill could have very different effects on their stock prices and whatever market reaction did take
place should be interpreted differently. For Company A, a 1% change in
value might imply one thing and a 50% change another. For Company
B, any change might be confounding. Because event studies, histori-
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cally, have not addressed these issues, assuming they could be
addressed, the results of event studies should be inconclusive.
III.

THE MARKET'S UNDERSTANDING OF DELAWARE LAW.

We also substantially discount the potential for event studies to
reach meaningful conclusions about poison pills because it is not clear
that the market, including market professionals, fully understands the
evolving standards that govern the use of pills and other defensive measures under Delaware law. In fact, we doubt whether a properly conducted event study would show any reaction to the series of pill
decisions that Delaware courts have rendered, despite the changing
nature of the Delaware's approach to pills and pill redemption.
Early poison pill decisions indicated that Delaware courts would
police the use of poison pills to ensure that they only were employed
reasonably. This promise was made expressly in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.,7 when the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors
who respond defensively must "show that they had reasonable grounds
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed" 8 and that they adopted a defense that was "reasonable in relationship to the threat posed." 9 The Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed
this promise in Moran v. Household International,Inc., 0 when, in holding that poison pills were legal under Delaware law, the court explained
that directors still must fulfill their fiduciary duties when relying on a
pill and that the propriety of such a use would be judged at the time the
pill was used in response to a takeover bid."I Household indicates that
the adoption of a pill is a rather benign event that does not require extensive court oversight.' 2 The decision to redeem or not redeem a pill is the
real decision that potentially is subject to abuse. How a pill is used in a
takeover contest creates the need for judicial review under the Unocal
standard, and the promise of Household was that directors would be held
accountable for their use of a pill in responding to a takeover attempt.
Consistent with these promises, a series of early Court of Chancery
cases suggested that a target board's ability to use a poison pill would be
limited. In these decisions, the Court of Chancery permitted boards to
rely on pills to defeat structurally coercive offers, to obtain time to nego7. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 955.

Id.
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 1357.
See In re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 14616, slip op.

at 41-42 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2000) (granting summary judgment in favor of directors on challenge
that the adoption of a "garden-variety poison pill" constituted a breach of fiduciary duty).
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tiate with the initial bidder, or to buy time to develop alternatives or
conduct an auction.13 The Court of Chancery repeatedly questioned,

however, whether a pill could be used indefinitely to block an all-cash,
all-shares offer. 4
On three occasions, the Court of Chancery actually required target
boards to redeem their poison pills to permit stockholders to choose
whether or not to tender into hostile offers. In City CapitalAssociates,
Limited Partnershipv. Interco, Inc., 15 the board of directors of a target
corporation attempted to use its pill to block an all-cash, all-shares offer

so that the board could complete a leveraged restructuring. 6 The Court
of Chancery explained that after a target board had completed its efforts
to develop alternatives, as the board in Interco had, the legitimate role of
the poison pill in the context of a noncoercive offer will have been fully
satisfied. The only function then left for the pill at this end-stage is to
preclude the shareholders from exercising a judgment about their own

interests that differs from the judgment of the directors, who will have
17
some interest in the question.
At that point, absent extraordinary circumstances not present in the
Interco case, it was for the stockholders to decide whether or not to sell
13. See generally City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797-98
(Del. Ch. 1988) (explaining that a pill could be used to defend against "structurally coercive
offers" or to enable "an active negotiator . . . to extract a higher or otherwise more valuable
proposal, or... to arrange an alternative transaction"). See, e.g., MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime
Computer, Inc., C.A. No. 10428, slip op. at 13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988) (finding "[o]f particular
significance . . . the fact that without the [pill and other] anti-takeover devices being in place,
plaintiff will not increase its offer"); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, C.A. No. 10095, slip op. at 5-6
(Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988) (stating that "[w]here the board has determined that the offered price is
inadequate and has decided to conduct an auction for the company, it may be appropriate to keep
the rights in place in order to allow time for higher bids to be made"); Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley
Continental, Inc., C.A. No. 9813, slip op. at 22 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (finding that "the rights
plan is obviously serving a useful purpose in allowing the Board to seek a more realistic offer").
14. As then Vice Chancellor, now Justice Berger observed,
It is difficult to understand how, as a general matter, an inadequate all cash, all
shares tender offer, with a back end commitment at the same price in cash, can be
considered a continuing threat under Unocal. . . . [W]here there has been sufficient
time for any alternative to be developed and presented and for the target corporation
to inform its stockholders of the benefits of retaining their equity position, the
"threat" to the stockholders of an inadequate, non-coercive offer seems, in most
circumstances, to be without substance.
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 289 (Del. Ch. 1989); accord Grand
Metropolitan, PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that in allcash, all-shares offer, "[wihatever danger there is relates solely to the shareholders and that concers price only"). See also MAI Basic Four, slip op. at 11 ("the tender offer is for all cash and
there is nothing about it which would indicate that it is coercive to stockholders").
15. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
16. See id. at 789-90.
17. See id. at 798 (footnote omitted).
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their shares in the tender offer. 8 The Court of Chancery followed a
similar approach in Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 9 in
which the court ordered a target board to redeem its stockholder rights
plan in the face of a premium offer where the board had ample time to
develop an alternative or conduct an auction, and where the respective
options were "sufficiently developed to permit an informed shareholder
choice." 2 The Court of Chancery also enjoined a poison pill in Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc.,2 where the target board of directors

conducted an auction and obtained the two highest bids available.22 The
court observed that the pill had served its purpose and its only remaining
function at that point was to protect the board's chosen transaction and
"deprive the shareholders of the opportunity to consider an alternative
cash transaction for a fair (indeed higher) price." 23
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,24 however, the
Delaware Supreme Court laid the foundation for a very different
approach to Unocal. There, Warner Communications Inc. and Time,
Inc. had agreed to a stock-for-stock merger that did not offer a premium
to either company's stockholders.25 Two weeks before the scheduled
stockholder vote on the merger, Paramount Communications announced
an all-cash, all-shares tender offer for Time at a substantial premium to
Time's market price. The Time board rejected the offer as inadequate,
elected to continue with its business combination with Warner, and
restructured the combination as a cash and securities acquisition of
Warner by Time.26
In subsequent litigation, Paramount and various Time stockholders
argued that the Time board's decision to ignore the Paramount offer and
recast the Time-Warner transaction as a cash acquisition of Time was an
unreasonable defensive response under Unocal.27 The Delaware
Supreme Court agreed that Unocal applied but upheld the Time board's
decision.28 In doing so, the court significantly expanded the deference
paid to directors under each prong of Unocal. On the first prong, the
court criticized certain Court of Chancery decisions that it read as sug18. See id. at 799-800.
19. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
20. Id. at 1060.
21. C.A. No. 10168 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 1988, revised Oct. 18, 1988), rev'd on other grounds,
559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
22. See id.
23. Id., slip op. at 50.
24. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 1146-47.
27. See id. at 1142.
28. See id.
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gesting "that an all-cash, all-shares offer, falling within a range of values
that a shareholder might reasonably prefer, cannot constitute a legally
recognized 'threat' to shareholder interests."'2 9
The Delaware Supreme Court then revealed a three-part typology
of possible threats that a tender offer might raise. These included:
(i) opportunity loss ...[where] a hostile offer might deprive target
shareholders of the opportunity to select a superior alternative offered
by target management [or, we would add, offered by another bidder];
(ii) structural coercion....the risk that disparate treatment of nontendering shareholders might distort shareholders' tender decisions;
and ...(iii) substantive coercion, . . . the risk that shareholders will
mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve management's representations of intrinsic value.3 °
Applying this framework, the Supreme Court found that:
the Time board reasonably determined that inadequate value was not
the only legally cognizable threat that Paramount's all-cash, allshares offer could present. Time's board concluded that Paramount's
eleventh hour offer posed other threats. One concern was that Time
shareholders might elect to tender into Paramount's cash offer in
ignorance or a mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which a business combination with Warner might produce. 3 '
Based on this "record evidence," the court deferred to the Time board's
conclusion that the Paramount offer constituted a threat. 32 Time thus
introduced into Delaware law the threat of substantive coercion, defined
as the ability of a board of directors to justify defensive measures based
on the board's belief that stockholders might tender into a hostile offer
out of "ignorance or a mistaken belief' about the value of the board's
chosen alternative.
The Delaware Supreme Court in Time also significantly expanded
the deference paid to directors under the second prong of Unocal. On
that issue, the court stressed that:
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to
the stockholders' duly elected board representatives. The fiduciary
duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time
frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the stockholders. Directors are not obliged to abandon a
29. Id. at 1152 (citing AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103
(Del. Ch. 1986); Grand Metropolitan, PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City
Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
30. Time, 571 A.2d at 1153 n.17 (bracketed alterations in original; quoting Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to ProportionalityReview?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 267 (1989)).
31. Id. at 1153.

32. See id. at 1154.
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deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder
profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate
strategy.3 3

This holding, combined with explicit criticism of "Interco and its progeny" elsewhere in the opinion, effectively overruled the line of Court of
Chancery cases indicating that, at some point, stockholders should be
able to decide whether to sell their shares in a tender offer.34 Ironically,

the Delaware Supreme Court then upheld the Time board's decision to
continue with the Time-Warner transaction because it was "not aimed at
'cramming down' on its shareholders a management-sponsored alternative, but rather had as its goal the carrying forward of a pre-existing
transaction in an altered form."' 35 The court did not elaborate on how the
recast Time-Warner transaction, which went forward as a tender offer by
Time for Warner that Time's stockholders were powerless to stop, differed from other "cram downs." The court simply held that "the
response was reasonably related to the threat."' 36 A strong reading of
this analysis suggested that so long as a board proffered a business plan
that had some rational basis, a board of directors could reject a premium
tender offer, continue with its business plan, and its decision would be
respected by a Delaware court. The possible implications of the
Time decision were not lost on commentators who read the case as recognizing the ability of a target board to "just say no" to a premium
tender offer.37

In Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,38 the Delaware

Supreme Court appeared to build on and broaden the deferential
approach to defensive action that it had adopted in Time.39 On the first
prong of the two-part Unocal test, the Unitrin court expanded the concept of substantive coercion that the Time court had introduced. ° In
Time, the Delaware Supreme Court had allowed the directors of Time to
rely on a perceived threat of substantive coercion based on their fear that
stockholders would not fully understand the value of an extraordinary
strategic combination that would have transformed the nature of Time as
a company. In Unitrin, by contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court permitted the directors of Unitrin, Inc. to invoke the doctrine of substantive
coercion based on alleged stockholder confusion about the value of Uni33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. See id. at 1153.
35. Id. at 1154-55 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 1155.
37. See, e.g., Law Firm Views on Impact of Paramount/Time Decision, 4 INsIlrrs 34 (May

1990).
38. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 1373-74.
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trin on a stand-alone basis, despite the fact that the stockholders obviously had purchased shares in Unitrin and could sell their shares at any
time in the open market. 41 The Unitrin court also broadened the operative test under the second prong of Unocal. As the court read prior case
law, Delaware decisions historically had invalidated only defensive
responses that either were preclusive or coercive.42 The Delaware
Supreme Court then held that so long as a defensive measure was not
preclusive or coercive, it would be upheld if it fell within a "a range of
reasonableness."43 In making this change, the court made clear that it
intended to grant a substantial degree of leeway to target directors:
The ratio decidendi for "range of reasonableness" standard is the
need of the board of directors for latitude in discharging its fiduciary
duties to the corporation and its shareholders when defending against
perceived threats. The concomitant requirement is for judicial
restraint. Consequently, if the board of directors' defensive response
is not draconian (preclusive or coercive) and is within a "range of
reasonableness," a court must not substitute its judgment for the
board's.'
After announcing these principles, the Unitrin court upheld the decision
of the Unitrin directors to adopt a repurchase program that forced any
insurgent that wished to elect new directors to obtain the affirmative
vote of holders controlling more than a 74% supermajority of Unitrin's
outstanding stock.45
The potential risk for stockholders in Unitrin's deferential approach
became clear when the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware applied the Unitrin test in Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer
Services, Inc. 4 6 After Wallace Computer Services, Inc. rejected its

merger proposal, Moore Corporation Limited launched an all-cash, allshares tender offer for Wallace at a substantial premium over the Wallace's unaffected trading price.47 Moore also commenced a proxy solicitation to elect new Wallace directors that would consider its offer.48
Because of Wallace's defensive profile, which included a poison pill, a
classified board, and a prohibition on stockholder-called special meetings or action by written consent, Moore needed to prevail in proxy contests at two successive annual meetings in order to replace a majority of
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 1384.
See id. at 1388-90.
Id. at 1388.
Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 1383.

46. 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).

47. See id. at 1550-51.
48. See id.
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Wallace's directors.4 9 Faced with this prospect, Moore filed suit to compel Wallace to redeem its pill.5 0 At the time of the hearing on Moore's
motion for a preliminary injunction, 73.4% 5of1 Wallace's shareholders
had tendered their shares into Moore's offer.
Applying Unocal and Unitrin, the Moore court found that the Wallace board had properly identified a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness from the Moore offer and that the directors' decision to retain
the pill indefinitely fell within a range of reasonableness. 5 2 The court
accepted the Wallace board's identification of a threat of substantive
coercion in light of the facts that the board (i) met on multiple occasions
to review the terms of the offer and assess its merits, (ii) retained
Goldman Sachs as its investment banker, (iii) had Goldman Sachs prepare an analysis using projections based on past growth and historical
data provided by Wallace management, and (iv) collectively considered
Wallace's "current business plans and strategies, its financial projections, its current financial results and future projections, and the opinion
of Goldman in arriving at its decision that the . . .offer was inade-

quate.

53

Based on these factors, the court deferred to the board's con-

clusion "that Moore's tender offer poses a threat ...

that shareholders,

because they are uninformed, will cash out before realizing the fruits of
the substantial technological innovations achieved by Wallace."54
After finding that Moore's offer constituted a threat, the court
turned to the second prong of Unocal. The court found the Wallace's
board's response - leaving Wallace's shareholder rights plan in place
indefinitely - proportional in light of the threat perceived. 5 Applying
Unitrin, the court found that the pill was not coercive because the
"retention of the pill will have no discriminatory effect on shareholders." 56 The court also found that the pill was not preclusive, because it
would "have no effect on the success of [a] proxy contest. '57 With these
issues resolved, the court noted that to uphold the pill, the court "must
58
merely be satisfied that it fell within a 'range of reasonableness.'"
Based on the board's argument that "[s]hareholders, at the time of the
Moore offer, were unable to appreciate the upward trend in Wallace's
earnings," the court concluded that "[g]iven this situation, the Wallace
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id. at 1550-51.
See id. at 1551.
See id. at 1553.
See id. at 1563.
Id. at 1558.
Id. at 1560-61.
See id. at 1563.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Board's response can hardly be deemed unreasonable."5 9 The effect of
this decision was to permit the directors to block Wallace's offer for two
years.
If Moore truly represents Delaware law, then it is difficult to conceive of a situation when a Delaware court would order a target board to
redeem a poison pill to permit stockholders potentially to accept a premium tender offer. Two recent decisions by the Court of Chancery,
however, suggest that the Moore court may have misread Unitrin and
that the doctrine of substantive coercion was not intended to provide an
ever-ready justification for defensive action.
In Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,6 0 the Court of Chancery examined
in detail the development of substantive coercion, its theoretical underpinnings and the risks inherent in an overly deferential approach to the
doctrine. 61 As a threshold matter, the court noted that:
Substantive coercion can be invoked by a corporate board in almost
every situation. There is virtually no CEO in America who does not

believe that the market is not valuing her company properly. Moreover, one hopes that directors and officers can always say that they
know more about the company than the company's stockholders -

after all, they are paid to know more. Thus, the threat that stockholders will be confused or wrongly eschew management's advice is
omnipresent.62
The court trenchantly observed that because substantive coercion can be
so readily invoked, "the use of this threat as a justification for aggressive
defensive measures could easily be subject to abuse.

63

The court also criticized the theory for tending to ascribe "rube-like
qualities to stockholders."' As the court explained, "[ijf stockholders
are presumed competent to buy stock in the first place, why are they not
presumed competent to decide when to sell in a tender offer after an
adequate time for deliberation... ?,16 The court further noted that the
doctrine permits directors to make "fundamental investment decisions
for the company's owners," yet the directors bear no risk if they errone-

ously block a premium offer and the stock price drops.6 6 The court also
questioned why "the threat of substantive coercion seems to cause a
ruckus in boardrooms most often in the context of tender offers at...
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
C.A. No. 17626 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2000, revised Feb. 11, 2000).
See id.
Id., slip op. at 74.
Id.
Id., slip op. at 76.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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substantial premiums. ' 67 The court observed that stockholders regularly
sell into the market at levels below what insiders believe to be the true
value of the company, yet directors ironically only take steps to protect
stockholders from themselves when a premium offer surfaces.6 8
Finally, and most importantly, the Chesapeake court recognized
that a license for boards to invoke substantive coercion "without a serious examination of the legitimacy of that defense would undercut the
purpose the Unocal standard of review was established to serve."6 9 The

fundamental teaching of Unocal is that enhanced judicial scrutiny of
boards facing takeover threats is necessary because of an inherent conflict of interest between stockholders and management.7 ° In light of
these concerns, the Chesapeake court concluded that "[t]he only way to
protect stockholders is for courts to ensure that the threat [of substantive
coercion] is real and7 that the board asserting the threat is not imagining
or exaggerating it." '
Applying these principles, the Chesapeake court found that the target board of directors in that case had "not come close to demonstrating
that it identified [a threat of substantive coercion] at any time 'after a
reasonable investigation' and 'in good faith"' before taking defensive
72
action in response to an unsolicited tender offer and proxy contest.
The target directors failed to introduce any persuasive evidence to
demonstrate that they had considered a threat of stockholder confusion
when they adopted their defensive response, and the court instead suggested that the threat was concocted one month later when the board
retained more experienced advisors.7 3 The court also found that the
directors slighted or totally disregarded key issues, including the makeup
of the target company's stockholder profile, thorough coverage of the
target by analysts, ample information in public disclosures and the selfproclaimed credibility of management and its ability to provide additional information to stockholders.7 4 Chesapeake marks the first time

since Time that a Delaware court has meaningfully analyzed and then
rejected a target board's assertion of substantive coercion.75
Another recent decision by the Court of Chancery indicates that the
67. Id., slip op. at 77.
68. See id.
69. Id., slip op. at 78.
70. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (adopting the enhanced scrutiny standard "[b]ecause of
the onmipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those
of the corporation and its stockholders" when responding to a threat to corporate control).
71. Chesapeake, slip op. at 74-75.
72. Id., slip op. at 85 (emphasis added).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See generally id., slip op. at 74-88.
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Delaware courts still stand by the promise of Household that a board's
decision to employ a rights plan during a takeover contest will be
reviewed carefully. In In re Gaylord Container Corp. ShareholdersLitigation,7 6 the Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of
directors and against a class of stockholders who claimed the board had
breached its fiduciary duties by adopting a "garden-variety poison
pill."'77 The board had adopted the pill as part of a careful process of
evaluating its takeover preparedness and not in response to any particular threat. 78 The Gaylord court noted expressly that "in the event of a
concrete battle for corporate control, the board's decision to keep the pill
in place in the face of an actual acquisition offer will be scrutinized
again under Unocal.' '79 The court elsewhere warned that "[i]n the event
of an actual offer, it may well be that the Gaylord board's decision to
use the defensive measures to block the stockholders from considering
the transaction could be deemed unreasonable under [Unocal]."8 This
point was so important that the court later reiterated its caveat: "[i]t
bears re-emphasis that the conclusion that the adoption of this approach
by a disinterested board on a clear day was proper does not necessarily
validate, for example, similar action by an interested board designed to
preclude a particular bidder from mounting a proxy fight or consent
solicitation effort."8" The triple repetition of this point is a strong reaffirmation of the promise of Household.
In light of these shifting approaches, to the extent that takeover
fluff adds value to the price of a company's stock and to the extent that
judicial decisions and their implications are internalized by the market,
one logically would expect that a carefully designed study would show
some measurable difference between the trading price of a company
with a virtually impregnable defensive profile - i.e., a combination of a
staggered board, the elimination of stockholder action by written consent, and the inability of stockholders to call special meetings - and the
trading price of comparable companies with defensive profiles that provide some effective mechanism for stockholders to receive takeover
bids. One also would expect that a carefully designed study would
reveal some fluctuation in the market prices of Delaware corporations in
light of the ebb and flow of Delaware decisional law. Given these
assumptions (i.e., the existence of takeover fluff and a market that is
perfectly efficient regarding both takeover fluff and Delaware decisional
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Consol.
Id., slip
See id.
Id., slip
Id., slip
Id., slip

C.A. No. 14616 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2000).
op. at 41.
op. at 42.
op. at 3.
op. at 44 n.70.
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law), one might expect a marginal decrease in market price after Household in light of the court's decision to uphold the legitimacy of the pill,
mitigated by the promise to police the actual use of pills in takeover
contests. After Time, after Unitrin and, most significantly, after Moore,
one might expect further decreases as the promise of Household
appeared to grow more and more ephemeral. After the recent decisions
in Chesapeake and Gaylord, one might expect an increase in market
price, based on the inference that the Moore court had misread Time and
Unitrin and that Chesapeake and Gaylord reflect current Delaware law.
As discussed below, however, we doubt that such a study would show
that the market reacted to any of these decisions as one might expect.
Before explaining our reasons for doubt, we note that the focal
point of any such study should not be on poison pills but on the overall
defensive profiles of target companies and the resulting ability of target
corporation stockholders to receive takeover bids. Moore shows that it
is the combination of a staggered board, the elimination of stockholder
action by written consent, and the inability of stockholders to call special
meetings that closes off the routes by which an acquirer can circumvent
a poison pill. It is these key variables that distinguish companies, not
the mere presence or absence of a pill. A study that focused on these
variables would have much to commend it, and it appears that Professor
Coates may be headed towards this type of research himself.82 Moreover, there may already be some evidence to support the view that a company's defensive profile in the aggregate has an impact on stock price.
For example, one recently reported study by Professor Robert Daines
suggested that companies incorporated in Delaware command a market
premium of approximately 5% compared to companies incorporated
elsewhere.8" The difference may stem in part from Delaware's balanced
approach to takeover disputes, which contrasts with the stringent antitakeover laws of pro-management states. Another study further supports
this view by suggesting that a state's adoption of a restrictive, pro-management takeover statute has a statistically significant negative impact
on the stock price of firms incorporated in that state.84
We would not be surprised, however, if the results of such a study
failed to reveal a statistically significant relationship between defensive
profile and stock price. A healthy degree of skepticism is warranted
82. See Coates supra note 2, at 792-94.
83. See Steven Lipin, Firms Incorporatedin DelawareAre Valued More by Investors, WALL
ST. J. Feb. 28, 2000, at C21.
84. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation
Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 321 (1989) (finding that "on average, the initial press
announcement of a state takeover law is associated with a small but statistically significant
decrease in the stock prices of firms incorporated in the state").
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both because of the questionable existence of takeover fluff and the difficulties in measuring it, and because the key assumption in any such
study would be that the holdings of Delaware cases are disseminated
effectively throughout and internalized by the market. Experience with
market professionals suggests that this assumption will not hold.
Instead, the market appears to rely on anecdotal accounts - something
largely akin to the generalizations of the popular press - to judge the
impact of poison pills and their effectiveness. Thus, in addition to
accepting the Delaware law position that the stock market does not perfectly determine value, we doubt that the market is informationally efficient when it comes to assessing the likely outcome of cases brought by
bidders or stockholders that seek to compel a target board of directors to
redeem a defensive measure such as a poison pill in support of a takeover attempt. Rather than incorporating infallibly the outcome of every
Delaware takeover case into a jurisprudential valuation metric, the market appears to operate based on the popular impressions of major decisions, in which victories for insurgents figure prominently. The market
thus remembers the landmark holding in Unocal and the adoption of the
Unocal test but forgets that the bidder in Unocal lost, not only in the
market but also before the Delaware Supreme Court. The market likewise recalls the resounding and headline-grabbing decisions in Interco
and Grand Metropolitan but forgets that court's nearly immediate criticism of those cases in Time and the numerous decisions that have upheld
the use of poison pills by target directors.
Auction contests offer a similar example of what appears to be
anecdotal market memory. Here, the market appears to recall the original decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,85
with its "auctioneer" language and "level playing field" metaphors. The
market similarly recalls Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,86 which appeared to confirm and revitalize the original Revlon holding. At the same time, the market understandably has
overlooked the numerous Delaware opinions that have refused to recognize Revlon as a separate doctrine and instead equated so-called "Revlon
duties" with the ordinary duties of directors.87 The market also seems to
85. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
86. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
87. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) (finding
"[t]here are no special and distinct 'Revlon duties"'); Goodwin v. Live Entertainment, Inc., C.A.
No. 15765, slip op. at 42 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999) (describing Revlon's teachings as "a

contextually-specific application of the directors' duty to act in accordance with their fiduciary
obligations"), affd, 741 A.2d 16 tbl. (Del. 1999); In re Lukens Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No.
16102, slip op. at 20 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 1999) (explaining that "'Revlon duties' refer only to a
director's performance of his or her duties of care, good faith and loyalty in the unique factual
circumstance of a sale of control over the corporate enterprise"); Wells Fargo & Co. v. First
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have overlooked the Delaware courts' creation in the auction context of

a double-level of business judgment deference, in which Delaware
courts defer not only to a decision made by directors based on the information reasonably available88 but also to a decision made by directors
about the amount of information they needed to make their decision.8 9
Another fruitful area of research might be to survey market makers,
investment bankers, proxy solicitors, mergers and acquisitions attorneys,
and representative stockholders to determine to what extent information
about Delaware case law, defensive profiles, and the potential for successful takeover bids actually permeates the market.
IV.

PILLS ARE HERE TO STAY, So LET'S

TuRN OuR

ATTENTION ELSEWHERE.

The bottom line is that Professor Coates ig right: Event studies of
pills are flawed, although we endorse his conclusion primarily for reasons that he does not identify. Professor Coates also is right on his far
Interstate Bancorp., C.A. Nos. 14696, 14623, slip op. at 10 n.3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1996) (observing
that "in part 'Revlon duties' are not distinctive board duties at all, but a changed standard of
judicial review"); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(rejecting argument that Revlon announced a special duty "that arises once it is apparent that a
change in control of the corporation is to occur ... [and] that it is the duty of the board in that
setting to keep a 'level playing field' among potential bidders"); Citron v. Fairchild Camera &
Instrument Corp., C.A. No. 6085, slip op. at 44 n.17 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988) (finding it
"unnecessary to specifically treat [the plaintiffs' Revlon claim]" except to say that the plaintiffs
reading of the case as creating special duties was "certainly incorrect"), affd, 569 A.2d 53 (Del.
1989); In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 9991, slip op. at 34 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (describing and rejecting the view that "Revlon establishe[d] rules that [come]
into play whenever the Company is for sale").
88. See J.P.Stevens, 542 A.2d at 783 (explaining that "[iun [an auction], reasonable directors,
exercising honest, informed judgment, might differ as to what course of action would most likely
maximize shareholder interests .... These are precisely the sort of debatable questions that are
beyond the expertise of courts and which the business judgment rule generally protects from
substantive review for wisdom."); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., C.A. No. 9536, slip op. at 14
(Del. Ch. Feb 8, 1988) (explaining that "what specific methods corporate directors may use to
elicit bids from potential acquirers ... would appear to be normally a matter of director judgment
that necessarily must vary with each case"); Fort Howard, slip op. at 35 (stating that "[the need to
exercise judgment is inescapably put on the board at points in an auction process and the validity
of the exercise of that judgment is appropriately subjected to a business judgment form of judicial
review.")
89. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, slip op. at 54 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 31, 1989) (explaining that "the amount of information that it is prudent to have before a
decision is made is itself a business judgment of the very type that courts are institutionally poorly
equipped to make"); Citron, slip op. at 49 (finding that "just how much information prudence
requires before a decision is made is itself a question that calls for informed judgment of the kind
courts are not well-equipped to make"); Solash v. Telex Corp., C.A. No. 9518, slip op. at 21-22
(Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988) (concluding that "[w]hether the benefit of additional information is worth
the cost - in terms of delay and in terms of alternative uses of time and money - is always a
question that may legitimately be addressed by persons charged with decision-making
responsibility.").
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more important point - namely, that after Household legitimized the
adoption of poison pills, all Delaware corporations effectively have had
poison pills in place. As Professor Coates explains, any company that is
operating without a poison pill can implement a pill if it receives a takeover bid.90 Although Professor Coates underestimates the time and
effort required to educate a board of directors about the implications and
operation of a pill so that they would be able to make an informed and
independent decision about its adoption, 91 he is correct that the step can
be accomplished within the twenty-day time period during which tender
offers must be kept open under the federal securities laws.92 Professor
Coates concludes from this:
[P]ill adoption by particular firms rarely has (non-signal) effects on
bids, because of the possibility of later adoption. Thus, it is the
potential for the pill that achieves the great bulk of the pill's deterrent
effect (to the extent it has one). Another way of putting the point is
that once the Delaware Supreme Court made it clear in [Household]
that pills were legitimate to adopt, all Delaware firms (except those
few with other governance terms that would impede pill adoption)
have had a "shadow pill" in place, witting or not, and takeovers of
such firms have thus been restrained by a set of "shadow restrictions"
(the expectation of a pill's adoption and subsequent effects) on transfer of control to a hostile bidder. Whether or not the potential for
pills has had an impact on bids remains open, precisely because the
point being made here has not been reflected in studies of defenses.9 3

This insight both explains why past event studies have failed to detect
any stock price impact from pills and indicates that all event studies of
contemporaneous stock price performance across companies will fail to
detect any impact from pills. Put simply, both sets of companies in any
contemporaneous study effectively have pills in place. 94
In our view, the fundamental lesson to be drawn from this insight is
simply that scholars can stop studying pills. This is another way of
admitting that we live today in the poison pill era. Because pills are
90. See Coates, supra note 2 at 791.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. This does not mean that pills do not affect stockholder wealth, only that to the extent
some effect exists, it necessarily affects the entire market. Theoretically, in other words, if the
market currently has a collective value of $X, then if Household had gone the other way, the
market currently would have a value of $X + $Y. This suggests that a cross-time study of
companies before and after Household might detect a value effect in pills. Unfortunately, this also
appears impossible, and Professor Coates cogently explains why Household cannot be viewed as
the "precise moment in the development of Delaware law that could be isolated as the 'event' that
resolved the legality of the standard pill in its full operation." Id. at n.110. This observation
applies equally to the other decisions discussed in the text.
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both effective and omnipresent, the tender offer no longer is a viable
means of attempting a takeover of a public company. A tender offer
currently provides only a means of lending economic credibility to an
insurgent slate in a proxy fight or consent solicitation. Stockholder voting is the central issue in today's takeover battles, and scholars should
be encouraged to shift their prodigious talents away from pills and
tender offers and towards questions of stockholder voting behavior and
the impact of defensive measures on the stockholder franchise. Professor Coates's excellent article shows there is much to gain and nothing to
lose from such a shift.

